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DIFFERENTIATION AND DISFUNCTION: AN EXPLORATION OF  
POST-LEGISLATIVE GUIDANCE PRACTICES IN 14 EU AGENCIES 
 
STEVEN VAUGHAN# 
 
 
ABSTRACT: 
 
This paper offers up a map of self-authored post-legislative guidance practice among the 
EU’s decentralized agencies. It shows that the use of guidance by EU agencies is widespread 
and significant, but not pervasive in that 14 of the EU’s 33 agencies currently engage in 
guidance making. Where guidance is produced, it varies significantly between and within 
agencies as regards volume and length. These documents are hard to find, they are called a 
miscellany of different things and there seems to have sprang up, ad hoc, a hierarchy to 
guidance that is both interesting and lacking in clarity. The question as to whether such 
guidance binds those to whom it has been addressed has been fudged, with agencies and 
courts engaging in exercises of tautology and misdirection to avoid the appearance of 
anything that looks like binding norm making by the EU’s agencies. Consultation and 
participation in the making of guidance seems lackadaisical. This map suggests a level of 
differentiation that is so ill thought out, and so ad hoc, so lacking in foresight and oversight, 
as to be disfunctional. At the same time, the lack of engagement by the EU courts with these 
norms suggests that the site of opportunity for a way forward in this area lies other than with 
the judiciary. 
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Since 1975 agencies have been a part of the EU institutional landscape,1 although more than 
half of the current suite of EU agencies were created in the last decade,2 following 
enlargement, the intensification of the internal market and the widening of EU competences.3 
The EU’s appetite for such agencies is said to be ‘limitless’,4 and Madalina Busuioc has 
argued that EU, ‘agencification has arisen, grown and progressed in the shadow of the law, 
without an explicit basis in the treaties.’5 Geographically located across the EU, these 33 
decentralized agencies have legal personality, pool expertise and carry out a variety of 
                                                     
# University of Birmingham. I am very grateful to Aleksandra Cavoski, Elizabeth Fisher, Maria Lee, Robert 
Lee, Joanne Scott, the editors and the anonymous reviewer for comments on an earlier draft. The usual 
disclaimer applies. 
1 When CEDEFOP and EUROFOUND were both established. 
2 M Busuioc, European Agencies: Law and Practices of Accountability (OUP, 2013) p14 
3 V Hatzopoulos, ‘Hard to Soft: Governance in the EU Internal Market’, (2012) Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies 101, p127 
4 D Geradin and N Petit, ‘The Development of Agencies at EU and National Levels: Conceptual Analysis and 
Proposals for Reform’ (Jean Monnet Working Paper 01/04, 2004) p4 
5 Busuioc, note 2 above at p5 
technical, managerial and scientific tasks.6 But they do not, supposedly, also promulgate 
regulation or engage in policy making. Unlike independent regulatory agencies in the US,7 
there is a ‘theoretical bar’ on EU institutions delegating to EU agencies powers that have 
been conferred on those institutions by the Treaties.8 However, it has been argued that some 
EU agencies have so much power, and so much autonomy, that they ‘stretch the boundaries 
of the legal [non-delegation] doctrine to the maximum.’9 The focus of this paper lies in what 
powers, if any, have been granted via legislation to each of the EU’s 33 agencies to produce 
self-authored guidance. On a much more practical level, this paper also explores how those 
powers have played out in the real world: the volume of guidance those agencies have 
produced; what it looks like; where it is kept; how the agencies speak of it; how easy the 
guidance is to find etc.10  
 Governance in the EU can be understood as a complex world of hybrid rules in which 
legislative and non-legislative texts and tools issued from a variety of sources interact with 
each other in multiple ways from ‘not at all’ to wholly fused on multiple levels, amid of a 
constellation of public and private actors.11 This paper is concerned with post-legislative 
guidance, norms that are yoked onto underpinning hard law,12 as one aspect of that complex 
world, and offers up a map of post-legislative guidance practice among the EU’s 
decentralised agencies.13 This map, of a ‘plural legal landscape’,14 allows for five conclusions 
to be drawn. First, self-authored post-legislative guidance by EU agencies is widespread, but 
not pervasive. Second, ‘guidance’ takes a multiplicity of forms, reinforcing some of the core 
ideas of new governance approaches as flexible, diverse and experimental.15 In this paper, 
                                                     
6 http://europa.eu/about-eu/agencies/index_en.htm  
7 XA Yataganas, ‘Delegation of Regulatory Authority in the European Union: The Relevance of the American 
Model of Independent Agencies’ (Jean Monnet Working Paper 03/01, 2001) 
8 C Harlow and R Rawlings, Process and Procedure in EU Administration (Hart Publishing, 2014) p244. This 
non-delegation doctrine originated in 1958 in the case of Meroni v High Authority, C-9/56, EU:C:1958:133. For 
a discussion of Meroni, and its impacts, see: Busuioc, note 6 above at p18 ff. In a more recent case on Meroni, 
the European Court of Justice held that because the powers of an EU agency were “precisely delineated and 
amenable to judicial review in the light of the objectives established by the delegating authority” those powers 
were Meroni compliant. See: UK v European Parliament and Council, C-270/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:18, para 53 
9 Busuioc, note 2 above at p19. See also: S Griller and A Orator, ‘Everything under Control? The Way Forward 
for Agencies in the Footsteps of the Meroni Doctrine’ (2010) 35 European Law Review 3; and E Chiti, 
‘European Agencies’ Rulemaking: Powers, Procedures and Assessment’ (2013) 19(1) European Law Journal 93 
10 Between February and April 2015, I reviewed the websites of the EU’s decentralised agencies. I took a 
threefold approach to finding the guidance documents. First, I searched the website for the terms ‘guidance’ and 
‘guidelines’. Second, I explored the website sections variously headed ‘Publications’, ‘Document Libraries’, 
‘Documents’ etc. Third, I had a much less methodical play with the website: looking to see how it was 
structured and organized, how topics/issues were grouped together etc. I accept this is not, perhaps, the most 
robust of all methodologies, but the aim in this paper is to provide an introduction and overview to, rather than 
the final word on, these issues.  
11 For a wider review of the possible connections and disconnections between different aspects of EU 
governance, see: KA Armstrong, ‘The Character of EU Law and Governance: From 'Community Method' to 
New Modes of Governance’ (2011) 63 Current Legal Problems 179. For a more general review of EU policy 
making, see: H Wallace, MA Pollack and AR Young (eds), Policy-making in the European Union, 6th ed 
(Oxford University Press, 2010) 
12 The concept of ‘yoking’ comes from Trubek and Trubek. See: DM Trubek and LG Trubek, ‘New Governance 
and Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry and Transformation’, (Wisconsin Law School Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series No 1047, May 2007)  
13 For the full list of these agencies, see Appendix 1 to this paper. For reasons of brevity, I have used the 
agencies’ acronyms rather than their full names.  
14 KA Armstrong, ‘Differentiated Economic Governance and the Reshaping of Dominium-Law’ (University of 
Cambridge Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 7/2014) p2 
15 G de Búrca and J Scott (eds) Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing, 2006); G de 
Búrca, C Kilpatrick and J Scott (eds) Critical Legal Perspective on Global Governance: Liber Amicorum David 
M Trubek (Hart Publishing, 2014)  
‘guidance’ is used as a shorthand overarching term to encompass those post-legislative 
instruments that are called ‘guidance’ and those which are called something else - guidelines, 
guides, formats, common approaches, position papers, advices, nutshells, handbooks, 
technical guides, standards, FAQs etc16 - but which fulfill the same function.17 My focus, for 
this paper, is specifically and solely on guidance which is self-authored by the EU agencies 
and bears their names. I am not interested in guidance issued by others (e.g. the Commission) 
which EU agencies use or adopt. As such, I am concerned with an agency’s own sense of its 
functions and how it will carry them out; and not with constraints placed on an agency by 
guidance authored by those delegating authority to that agency. This focus arises because the 
capacity of an agency to expand its competences through guidance might not be compliant 
with the theoretical bar (discussed above) on non-delegation of regulatory powers to EU 
agencies. 
The third conclusion that can be drawn from this paper is that the nature of guidance 
is, on the face of it, poorly understood by those who issue it, particularly in the context of its 
bindingness. Fourth, it is very unclear as to who is permitted to input into what guidance and 
when. This raises importance issues of participation. Fifth, and relatedly, public access to 
these guidance documents operates as a function of the (often poor) quality of the respective 
agency websites. 
The remainder of this paper unfolds in four parts. Part one situates this paper within 
the field of scholarship on new governance and hybrid law. Part two is the map of post-
legislative guidance practice. Part three looks at how post-legislative guidance has been 
understood by the EU courts. To précis, the cases on post-legislative norms (compared to 
other, non-yoked forms of soft law) are few in number and say very little of substance. The 
final part of this paper argues that we what see with post-legislative guidance practice among 
the EU’s decentralised agencies is not only differentiated but disfunctional, and requires 
intervention.  
 
 
I. NEW GOVERNANCE AND HYBRID LAW 
 
Much of the early work in the new governance field is on contrasts: on setting out and 
exploring the dichotomies between old and new governance, and between hard and soft law. 
What this paper will show is that post-legislative practice in the EU is more complex, more 
nuanced and messier than can be accounted for via some of the simple dyads to which some 
new governance scholars have previously been drawn.18 New governance scholarship has 
been criticised for its ‘definition-by contrast’ approach and for idealising the ‘new’ over the 
‘old’.19 This is in spite of the origins of this body of scholarship in offering up a critical 
                                                     
16 Each of these terms is used by one or more of the EU agencies under review in this paper. Such diversity has 
also been seen with post-legislative guidance issued by the Commission – see: H Hofmann, ‘Negotiated and 
Non-Negotiated Administrative Rule-Making - The Example of EC Competition Policy’ [2006] 43 Common 
Market Law Review 153 
17 In other work, I have argued that the functions of post-legislative guidance can be fourfold: (i) such can 
amplify or expand on the underlying hard law; (ii) that guidance can standardize the actions of those subject to 
the law; (iii) it can translate the law (i.e. where guidance implicitly contests and goes against the drafting of the 
underlying law, ‘translating’ the relevant provisions into something else); and/or (iv) post-legislative guidance 
can extrapolate from the law (i.e. guidance can fill in the gaps where the legislative text is silent on a given 
matter). See: S Vaughan, EU Chemicals Regulation: New Governance, Hybridity and REACH (Edward Elgar, 
2015)  
18 In Bund für Umwelt, AG Jaaskinen notes that the different parties to case had used the same Commission 
policy document to argue opposite points: Bund für Umwelt v Germany, C-461/13, EU:C:2010:773, point 106 
19 On the former, see: G de Búrca and J Scott, ‘Introduction’ in G de Búrca and J Scott (eds), Law and New 
Governance in the EU and US (Hart Publishing, 2006). On the latter, see: KA Armstrong, ‘New Governance 
review of the, ‘normative qualities of different “old” and “new” forms of governance in the 
EU, and their compatibility with the principles of the rule of law and democracy.’20 Binary 
distinctions do not account for variations in policy development or in the implementation, 
assessment and/or justiciability of various instruments.21 While dichotomies provide clear 
bright lines, and as such are attractive, there is a risk that these binary understandings 
‘undersell and under-explain’ changes that are occurring in the functions and definitions of 
law and governance.22  
It is important to move the debate beyond what I see as the rather blunt typologies of 
soft norms that have compared ‘preparatory and informative instruments’ with ‘interpretative 
and decisional instruments’;23 and ‘soft regulatory rule-making’ (involving para-law policy-
steering instruments) with ‘soft administrative rule-making’ (involving post-legislative 
guidance instruments).24 I am trying very hard in this article to avoid a regurgitation of the 
differences between hard and soft law because I am not convinced that such: (a) is helpful; 
and/or (b) explains adequately what we see with the hybrid world of post-legislative 
guidance.25 What this paper shows is that the hard law/soft law distinction is no longer fit for 
purpose as it no longer accurately reflects new governance in the EU. I would also agree with 
Kenneth Armstrong that the time has perhaps come to abandon the concept of ‘soft law’ as 
such is, ‘both over- and under-inclusive in its capacity to capture changes in law and 
governance.’26 These arguments tend towards the conlcusion that that we may need to 
seriously reconsider, and reframe, the boundaries of law to account for the breadth and depth 
of post-legislative guidance practice.27  
As a phenomenon and as a field of scholarship, new governance is a broad church.28 
As an approach, new governance seeks to explore, understand and critique changes in EU 
governance as they move away from traditional, top-down, command and control modes of 
regulation (associated with the Community Method) and towards deliberative, diverse, 
flexible, decentralized, experimental, multi-level, reflexive and participatory forms of 
decision-making.29 Gráinne de Búrca has suggested that the rise of new governance systems 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and the European Union: An Empirical and Conceptual Critique in G de Búrca, C Kilpatrick and J Scott (eds) 
Critical Legal Perspective on Global Governance: Liber Amicorum David M Trubek (Hart Publishing, 2014) 
20 C Joerges and M Weimer, ‘A Crisis of Executive Mangerialism in the EU: No Alternative?’ in G de Búrca, C 
Kilpatrick and J Scott (eds), Critical Legal Perspective on Global Governance: Liber Amicorum David M 
Trubek (Hart Publishing, 2014) 
21 C de la Porte and P Pochet, ‘Why and how (still) study the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC)?’ (2012) 
22 Journal of European Social Policy 336, p339 
22 KA Armstrong and C Kilpatrick, ‘Law, governance, or new governance - the changing open method of 
coordination’ (2007) 13(3) Columbia Journal of European Law 649, p654 
23 L Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law (Hart Publishing, 2004) p118 
24 L Senden and T van den Brink, ‘Checks and Balances of Soft EU Rule Making’ (Report for the European 
Parliament, March 2012), p12; L Senden, ‘Soft Post-legislative Rulemaking: A Time for More Stringent 
Control’ (2013) 19(1) European Law Journal 57, p60. Edoardo Chiti takes a similarly blunt approach in his 
work in this area: see note 9 above 
25 For those wanting a more rigorous review of soft law, see: F Snyder, ‘The Effectiveness of EC Law’ (1993) 
56(1) MLR 19; Senden, notes 23 and 24 above; and Senden and van den Brink, note 24 above 
26 Armstrong, note 19 above at p262 ff. See also: Armstrong and Kilpatrick, note 22 above 
27 Armstrong, note 19 above at p249 
28 On the former, see DM Trubek and LG Trubek, ‘The Coexistence of New Governance and Legal Regulation: 
Complementarity or Rivalry?’ (Paper, Annual Meeting of the Research Committee on the Sociology of Law, 
Paris, July 2005); G de Búrca and J Scott, ‘New Governance, Law and Constitutionalism’ in G de Búrca and J 
Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing, 2006); and G de Búrca, ‘New 
Governance and Experimentalism: An Introduction’ (2010) 2 Wisconsin Law Review 227. On the latter, see: 
Armstrong, note 19 above 
29 J Scott and DM Trubek, ‘Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the EU’ (2002) 8 
European Law Journal 1, p16; Armstrong and Kilpatrick, note 22 above at p654 
can be seen as a response to two background conditions: the first is ‘the need to address 
complex policy problems which have not shown themselves readily amenable to resolution’; 
and the second is the need to manage interdependence where divergent national regulatory 
regimes affect one another.30  
The formal frameworks of EU law, the Treaties, do not reflect modern EU 
governance. As Linda Senden puts it, ‘the catalogue of sources and hierarchy of norms in 
Articles 288 to 291 of the TFEU are of misleading simplicity’ and belie the many other 
instruments that have emerged in the EU’s institutional practice over time.31 There is no 
reference to soft norms or hybrid law in the categories of EU Treaty norms. Despite this, 
there has been a notable increase in the use of legislative guidance in the EU. This, Joanne 
Scott observes in the context of EU environmental law, is a product of increasing legislative 
complexity and a marked reliance on broad and imprecisely defined framework norms.32 
There are good reasons for the use of legislative guidance. The time the legislature has to 
consider legislation is limited, and some matters will necessarily be left for further debate. 
Equally, legislative knowledge at the point of law making can be incomplete and imperfect,33 
requiring elaboration in the post-legislative phase. In this way, post-legislative guidance has 
the potential to act as a corrective mechanism to flaws, gaps and/or missed opportunities. 
Equally, there will always be discretion in how legislative norms are interpreted, expanded on 
and operationalized.  
The term ‘hybrid’ is used in multiple ways in the context of EU law. It might be 
deployed to describe situations where regulation is multi-modal (for example, an instrument 
which combines both informational regulation plus some self-regulation),34 and/or where a 
given matter is controlled by both public and private forms of ordering.35 For new 
governance scholars, early notions of hybridity, including those by David Trubek and Louise 
Trubek and by Grainne de Búrca and Joanne Scott, refer to all situations in which hard and 
soft law complement each other, existing in the same field to promote the same goals (and as 
such could be co-legislative, extra-legislative or post-legislative).36 My interest is solely in 
the post-legislative, the situation in which post-legislative, non-legislative norms are fused, or 
yoked, onto underlying legislation. Here, self-authored guidance issued by EU agencies is a 
classic example of hybrid law. Trubek and Trubek argue that when new governance 
approaches are ‘yoked together in a hybrid form’ with conventional forms of regulation, we 
see a ‘real transformation in the law.’37 These hybrids are said to represent a new form of law 
                                                     
30 de Búrca, note 28 above at p232  
31 Senden, note 24 above, p57 
32 J Scott, ‘In Legal Limbo: Post-Legislative Guidance as a Challenge for European Administrative Law’ (2011) 
48 Common Market Law Review 329, p330 
33 M Wilkinson, Three Conceptions of Law: Towards a Jurisprudence of Democratic Experimentalism, (2010) 
Wisconsin Law Review 673, p682. Maria Lee has suggested that, in the context of the Water Framework  
Directive (WFD), post-legislative activity might have been a necessary part of the WFD’s ambitious approach. 
See: M Lee, ‘Law and Governance of Water Protection Policy’ in J Scott (ed) Environmental Protection: 
European Law and Governance (OUP 2009) 
34 D Levi-Faur, ‘Regulation and Regulatory Governance’ (JPRG Paper No. 1, February 2010) 
35 Carolyn Abbot and Maria Lee argue that, ‘The inclusion of private actors in EU environmental governance, 
and indeed in other areas of regulation at all levels, is absolutely routine.’ See: C Abbot and M Lee, ‘Economic 
actors in EU environmental law’ (2015) 34(1) Yearbook of European Law  
36 Trubek and Trubek, note 28 above; de Búrca and Scott, note 28 above 
37 Trubek and Trubek, note 12 above, p3. See also: DM Trubek, P Cottrell and M Nance, ‘Soft Law, Hard Law 
and European Integration: Toward a Theory of Hybridity’ (University of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 1002, 2005)  
and, as such, are ‘of special interest’.38 I would agree, and yet the scholarship on hybrid law 
in this context is quite limited, although growing.39  
There are those who set out valid concerns in the use of post-legislative guidance: 
concerns about legitimacy, accountability and justiciability.40 These may well equally apply 
to other forms of delegated/implementing acts.41 In a recent paper on EU sovereign debt 
instruments, Claire Kilpatrick sets out four potential problematic ‘Rule of Law challenge’ 
dimensions to the legislation she reviews.42 Three of these are also relevant to this paper: (i) 
complexity; (ii) inaccessibility (the relevant norms are hard to find); and (iii) 
incomprehensibility (as only English speakers can comprehend the majority of the sources).43 
These dimensions are discussed below. 
 
 
II. POST-LEGISLATIVE GUIDANCE AMONG 14 EU AGENCIES 
 
In this part of the paper, I map the differentiated self-authored post-legislative guidance 
practices among the EU’s decentralised agencies. What we see is that while the use of such 
guidance by these agencies is widespread, it is not pervasive. We also see that such guidance 
varies significantly in its length, in its formats, and in the grant of power via EU legislation to 
the agencies to produce the guidance. There is significant variation in the extent to which 
different publics, different stakeholders, are able to input into guidance making, and as 
regards ease of access to those documents. We further see, with some agencies, what appears 
to be a hierarchy of guidance, which raises interesting questions about the pluralisation of 
norms as part of the EU project.  
 
A. The Use of Guidance 
 
Of the 33 EU agencies reviewed for this paper, 14 produced post-legislative guidance and 15 
did not.44 Of the four agencies that remain, the SRB,45 a new EU agency established in 
January 2015 to step in when a bank in the EU fails or is about to fail, has the power to issue 
guidance,46 but has not yet done so. EU-LISA has not published any guidance documents, but 
its 2013 Activity Report suggests that ‘subject specific guidance’ will be issued in the 
                                                     
38 Trubek and Trubek, note 12 above, p5 
39 E Korkea-aho, ‘Legal Interpretation of EU Framework Directives: A soft law approach’ (2015) 40(1) 
European Law Review 70; W Howarth, ‘Aspirations and Realities under the Water Framework Directive: 
Proceduralisation, Participation and Practicalities’ (2009) 21(3) Journal of Environmental Law 391; J Scott and 
J Holder, ‘Law and New Environmental Governance in the European Union’ in G de Búrca and J Scott (eds), 
Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing, 2006); Scott, note 32 above; and Senden, 
note 24 above;. It is worth noting that the pieces by Howarth, Korkea-aho and by Scott and Holder concern post-
legislative guidance issued by the Commission and Member States in the context of the EU Water Framework 
Directive, and not guidance issued by an EU agency.  
40 Scott, note 32 above 
41 And so future work might usefully compare post-legislative guidance with other post-legislative frameworks 
for rule making (rather than with primary legislation). 
42 C Kilpatrick, ‘On the Rule of Law and Economic Emergency: The Degradation of Basic Legal Values in 
Europe’s Bailouts’ (2015) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1 
43 ibid, p7 
44 Those that did not were: FRONTEX; EASO; ECDC; CEDEFOP; EFCA; EUROFOUND; GSA; EIGE; 
EMCDDA; ENISA; CEPOL; EUROPOL; ETF; EUROJUST; and CdT. It is important to note that some of 
these agencies did produce guidance, but such was co-legislative (sitting alongside, but not linked to, 
legislation) or extra-legislative (existing in the place of legislation), rather than post-legislative.  
45 http://srb.europa.eu/  
46 Article 8(3), Commission Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 [2014] OJ L225/1 
future.47 With the final two agencies, the EEA and EU-OSHA, it was not at all clear whether 
they produce their own post-legislative guidance that bears their own names (as opposed to 
guidance that they use that is issued by, say, the Commission).48 Email queries to these two 
agencies for clarification had similarly unclear responses.49  
Among the 14 EU agencies that produced post-legislative guidance, practice differed 
significantly. Four each produced only one or two guidance documents.50 Eight produced 
considerably more, ranging from 18 (BEREC) to 163 (CPVO) guidance documents.51 The 
remaining two regulators, EMA and ESMA, both appear to publish a large number of 
guidance documents but the exact figure is hard to pin down. With EMA, 1,509 documents 
are returned when using the ‘Search Guidelines’ function on the ‘Human Regulatory’ part of 
website, but many of these appear to be the same document authored and published by EMA 
but in different EU languages. The same problem occurs with ESMA, where 363 ‘Guidelines 
and Recommendations’ are found when searching the website by document type: ‘Guidelines 
and Recommendations.’52 Issues of access are discussed below.  
Where agencies produced guidance documents, these varied significantly in length. 
Some were under 10 pages; most were between 15 and 60 pages long. However, a number 
were considerably longer. For example, the EFSA ‘Guidance on Data Exchange’ comprises 
173 pages;53 the single OHIM guideline is 605 pages (or 231,473 words) long,54 and ECHA’s 
21 core guidance documents on REACH amount to more than a million words (almost ten 
times as long as the text of the underlying Regulation).55 While my focus in this paper is not 
on what functions guidance may serve,56 one example of how guidance significantly 
operationalises legislation is perhaps worth pulling out. Article 29 of the EU’s flagship 
chemicals regulation REACH contains the bare command to registrants (chemical 
manufacturers, importers etc) to form a ‘substance information exchange forum’ or SIEF, a 
mandatory grouping of all registrants of the same substance who are obliged to come together 
to share chemicals testing data and submit a joint registration dossier containing that data.57 
REACH contains no other advice on how SIEFs are created or to be run. Instead, there are 
three key ECHA guidance documents relevant to SIEFs and data generation and assessment: 
(a) Guidance on Data Sharing (148 pages long);58 (b) Guidance on Information Requirements 
and Chemical Safety Assessment (28 linked guidance documents, amounting to more than 
                                                     
47 http://www.eulisa.europa.eu/AboutUs/WhoWeAre/Documents/eu-LISA%202013%20Activity%20Report.pdf  
48 See, for example: https://osha.europa.eu/en/topics/riskassessment/guidance.pdf 
49 A search of the EEA website for ‘guidance’ produces over 60,000 hits. The same search of the EU-OSHA 
website produced over 40,000 hits. Both websites were vast and challenging to navigate. 
50 ACER, EMSA, FRA and OHIM  
51 BEREC has 18 guidance documents; CPVO has four guidance documents and 159 ‘technical protocols’; 
EASA publishes 104 ‘acceptable means of compliance’ and ‘guidance materials’ documents; EBA has 32 ‘Final 
Products’ plus 54 ‘Related Documents’ under its ‘Guidelines; EIOPA has 27 guidelines plus 9 Opinions; ECHA 
has 28 ‘Guidance’ documents, 8 Nutshells, 10 factsheets, 16 practical guides and 14 formats; EFSA has 40 
guidance documents; and ERA has 11 ‘technical specifications’, one ‘application guide’, 8 ‘specific guides’ plus 
at least 6 ‘guidance documents’ 
52 These are two agencies where further exploration of their guidance could usefully be done.  
53 http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/search/doc/1895.pdf  
54 https://oami.europa.eu/tunnel-
web/secure/webdav/guest/document_library/contentPdfs/law_and_practice/trade_marks_practice_manual/WP/P
art-A/00-
editors_note_and_general_introduction/track_change/00_editors_note_and_general_introduction_tc_en.pdf  
55 http://echa.europa.eu/guidance-documents/guidance-on-reach  
56 Instead, see: Vaughan, note 17 above  
57 Article 29, Council Regulation (EC) 1907/2006 [2006] OJ L33/1 
58 http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13631/guidance_on_data_sharing_en.pdf 
200,000 words of text across 2,232 pages);59 and (c) Guidance for Identification and Naming 
of Substances (118 pages long).60 Of all the elements of REACH, the creation and running of 
SIEFs is the area in which guidance produced by ECHA amplifies the text of the Regulation 
and shapes the day-to-day operation of the legislation. I have suggested elsewhere that, 
without this guidance, data generation, assessment and sharing under REACH would fail.61  
There also seems to be a trend in that post-legislative guidance appears to be getting 
longer. For example, ACER has issued three editions of guidance linked to the REMIT 
Regulation.62 The first edition (December 2011) was 24 pages long; the second edition 
(September 2012) was 54 pages long; and the third edition (October 2013) is 60 pages long.63 
We might view revisions and new editions of post-legislative guidance in two distinct ways: 
first; we might see such as continuing and comprehensive ‘mission creep’ (expansions in the 
scope of agency norm making); or second, we might see new editions and updates as part of 
new governance claims of norm revisability in the light of practical experience. The 
challenge with the second view is that if, as discussed below, the judiciability of guidance is 
limited (and it is) then revisions and updates which raise concerns about legitimacy may go 
unchecked, notwithstanding the overall potential of guidance as a flexible and fluid 
correcting mechanism to legislation.  
Standing back, what we see is widespread but not pervasive production of post-
legislative guidance by almost half of the EU’s 33 decentralized agencies, amounting to 
hundreds of documents and thousands of pages. This is a significant practice, both as regards 
the exercises of power by EU agencies and as regards the wealth of norms that are yoked 
onto underlying legislation, and a practice that is under explored.  
 
 
B. The Grant of Power 
 
EU legislation grants power to EU agencies to issue guidance in three ways: (i) an agency can 
be obliged to produce guidance on a given, specific topic; (ii) an agency can be given a wide 
ranging, generic power to produce guidance; or (iii) an agency can be given both a generic 
power to produce guidance and there can be specific instances set out in the legislation in 
which guidance is required. The first of these is seen with only one agency, ACER.64 The 
second is seen with six of the EU agencies that produce guidance: BEREC;65 EASA;66 
EBA;67 EFSA; 68 EIOPA;69 ERA;70 and ESMA.71  The third is seen with CPVO,72 ECHA,73 
and SRB.74 
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60 http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13643/substance_id_en.pdf 
61 Vaughan, note 17 above at Chapter 6 
62 http://www.acer.europa.eu/remit/Pages/ACER_guidance.aspx  
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65 Article 6(2), Council Regulation (EC) No 1211/2009 [2009] OJ L 337/1 
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69 Article 16(1), Commission Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 [2010] OJ L331/48 
70 Articles 1 and 2, Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2004 [2004] OJ L220/3 
71 Article 16, Commission REGULATION (EU) No 1095/2010 [2010] OJ L331/84 
72 Articles 36(1)(a) and 56(2), Council Regulation (EC) No 2100/94 [1994] OJ L227 
73 See: http://echa.europa.eu/regulations  
74 Articles 8, 12 and 31, Commission Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 [2014] OJ L225/1 
There is also a fourth possibility: (iv) that EU legislation does not grant EU agencies 
any specific or generic powers to issue guidance to third parties, but instead sets out for those 
agencies other tasks which could, arguably, include guidance production. So, for example, 
with EMSA, there is no specific reference to guidance or guidelines, but Article 1(2) of its 
establishing Regulation sets out that the agency is to provide ‘technical, operational and 
scientific assistance.’75 Article 124(2)(a) of the Regulation establishing OHIM sets out that 
the President of OHIM, ‘shall take all necessary steps, including the adoption of internal 
administrative instructions and the publication of notices, to ensure the functioning of the 
Office.’76 The OHIM Guidelines are interesting in that they are not addressed to third parties 
but rather set out how the Office will make decisions and exercise its power when it receives 
applications for trademark and patent registrations. Other agencies also produce internal 
guidelines, and disclose that they exist, but do not also make the content of those guidelines 
public.77  
This leaves us with the EMA. Here, there is no specific grant of power to the Agency to 
produce guidance. Rather, in the different pieces of EU legislation on medicines,78 it is the 
Commission that is obliged to produce various guidelines. Where, or how, or if, these 
mandates have been delegated to the EMA is unclear, despite the guidance on the EMA 
website reviewed for this paper being published by the EMA under the Agency’s own name. 
As Chiti comments, ‘The EMA is not expressly entrusted with rulemaking powers by the 
establishing Regulation. And it seems rather reluctant to interpret its mission in such a way as 
to engage in the exercise of rulemaking tasks. Yet, it issues technical, scientific and 
procedural guidance concerning the implementation of the EU pharmaceutical legislative 
framework.’79 In Commission v UK, a matter concerning compliance by the UK with an EU 
Directive on urban waste water treatment, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) commented 
that, ‘[S]ince the concept of ‘unusually heavy rainfall’ is not defined by Directive 91/271, it 
is legitimate for the Commission, in carrying out its supervision of compliance with European 
Union law, to adopt guidelines.’80 Despite this, it is not clear whether such legitimacy would 
extend to an EU agency without some form of mandate in the underlying legislation.81 
For the majority of EU agencies, the underlying legislation says actually very little 
about the guidance those agencies are allowed to produce. As such, Chiti characterizes the 
procedural aspects of post-legislative guidance by EU agencies as ‘thin’, and argues that the, 
‘the overall tendency is to formalise only a very basic procedural outline.’82 The power to 
produce guidance is often given in the legislation free of limitation, and these agencies enjoy 
a wide discretion in what and when and how they produce guidance. However, with the EU’s 
three new financial services regulators, EBA, EIOPA and ESMA, there comes a new, more 
detailed, way of drafting obligations in relation to agency guidance.83 In the three pieces of 
                                                     
75 Council Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002 [2002] OJ L394/1 
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77 Two of the BEREC Guidelines are internal guidelines addressed to BEREC staff/committees. However, these 
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http://berec.europa.eu/eng/document_register/subject_matter/berec/regulatory_best_practices/guidelines/4885-
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79 Chiti, note 9 above at pp 97-98 
80 Commission v UK, Case C-301/10 ECLI:EU:C:2012:36, para 61 
81 See, for a recent case on this point: UK v European Parliament and Council, C-270/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:18 
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EIOPA and EMSA legislation and Article 52 of Council Regulation No 216/2008 [2008] OJ L79/2 establishing 
EFSA 
legislation establishing the three agencies is the same provision, Article 16.84 Unlike other 
legislative mandates to produce guidance, Article 16 sets out expectations as to consultation, 
impact assessments, the use of stakeholder groups, articulates a ‘comply or explain’ (or 
‘naming and shaming’)85 approach to guidance, and introduces an obligation on the Agency 
to report on compliance. This approach is unique and is not, for example, seen with the EU’s 
newest agency, the Single Resolution Board. The grant of power to the SRB to produce 
guidance is as thin, and as lacking in detail as that granted to many of the older agencies.86 It 
seems then that the need for harmonization in the context of EU financial services is special, 
different and worthy of a new approach in the context of the powers formally granted to those 
agencies.87 It is also seems that there is not a marked evolution in how the legislature 
introduces guidance making powers into EU laws (such that Article 16 represented the ‘best’ 
modern, reflective approach and would be the standard going forward). In the final part of 
this paper, I argue that elements of the Article 16 approach might represent good practice that 
should be adopted across all EU agencies.  
 
C. Bindingness 
 
The following two sections concern the potential bindingness of guidance and the extent to 
which guidance has, or will come to have, its own hierarchies. These two sections are 
inextricably linked. It is possible to see bindingess, in the context of post-legislative 
guidance, as being comprised of two core facets: (i) an obligation on the recipient (state, 
entity, citizen) to follow that guidance (a contingent duty of the ‘comply or explain’ variety); 
and/or (ii) an obligation on the guidance maker  (here, the relevant EU agency) to follow the 
practices and procedures that that guidance lays out.88 My interest is more with the former 
facet than the latter, and with the fallacy that because there is no legal obligation to comply 
with guidance then that guidance is not binding (such that compliance with the underlying 
legislative norm could be achieved by alternative means). The latter facet raises interesting 
questions of legitimate expectations, which are discussed in the section that follows on 
guidance hierarchies. The European Court of Justice has recognized that lack of bindingness 
is not synonymous with lack of legal effect.89 It is perfectly possible to imagine, and to find 
examples of, heavily prescriptive, very detailed, rigid post-legislative guidance that is 
comparable to the most complex EU legislative text, and, equally, possible to imagine and to 
find examples of guidance that is wide, vague and incapable of producing legal effects. As 
such, I would suggests that what matters is not what the text of the thing says, but whether 
that text influences or determines the behavior of addressees (whether external – State, entity, 
citizen – or internal – the agency itself). As such, the developing agency hierarchy in 
guidance (discussed below) is largely meaningless if addressees view all guidance as the 
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87 Busuioc, note 85 above at p112 
88 I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for a specific suggestion on these two aspects. 
89 Grimaldi v Fonds des maladies professionnelles, C-322/88, EU:C:1989:4407 
same, and equally influential or determinative (although I accept that this supposition 
requires empirical evidence). 
Emilia Korkea-aho opens her book on new governance with the following, 
 
In the comic strip that Kevin Tuma drew for the periodical Regulation, a big eyed, 
bald man stares, with a kind of exasperated expression on his face, at a piece of 
paper that reads, ‘The Very Big Regulatory Agency of America has issued the 
following Guidelines: “We Recommend that YOU MUST DO THE 
FOLLOWING…”’90 
  
Scholarship on soft law is preoccupied with the question of bindingness.91 This is perhaps a 
by-product of the history of the field. Starting in the 1970s much of the writing on hard 
law/soft law comes from literature in law and political science on international relations and 
public international law.92 In this area, defining ‘law’ (and, as a corollary, its hard and soft 
forms) is difficult and soft law in this context is largely (but not exclusively) premised on 
informality and voluntarism.93 There are a number of scholars who argue that the notion of 
‘soft’ law is a contradiction: either law is binding (or hard) or it is not law.94 However, Linda 
Senden has commented, and I would agree, that ‘the distinction binding/non-binding is too 
black-and-white, too simple’.95 I would suggest that a better emphasis than binding/not-
binding is found in a presentation given by Niamh Moloney at a January 2014 EBA 
workshop in which she questions ‘the normative colour of guidance,’96 and which allows for 
a spectrum in the context of whether guidance influences or determines the behavior of 
addressees. 
EU frame the extent to which their guidance is or is not binding in two main ways: 
direct statements as to bindingness; and through the use of disclaimers. I am interested both 
in the variety of practices on direct statements and disclaimers, and in what, if anything, those 
statements and disclaimers mean.97 Of the 14 agencies that produce guidance three agencies 
state, in every guidance document that they produce, that such guidance is not legally 
binding.98 Five agencies sometimes have statements about bindingness and sometimes do 
not, with no real pattern as to when or why this happens.99 Four agencies do not make 
statements as to bindingness in their guidance documents, but such can be found in higher 
level FAQs or scene setting approach documents.100 The remaining two agencies make no 
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97 The European Ombudsman has considered the nature of disclaimers in a number of recent rulings. For an 
account of these, see: M Lee, ‘Accountability and Co-Production Beyond Courts: The Role of the European 
Ombudsman’ (Working Paper for ‘Regulating Risks in the EU: The Co-production of Expert and Executive 
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98 ACER; EMSA and OHIM 
99 BEREC; EBA; EFSA; ERA; ESMA 
100 EASA; ECHA; EIOPA; EMA 
statements as to bindingness.101 The language used in some of the BEREC ‘Guidelines’ is 
particularly perplexing: ‘This guidance is not legally binding. Nevertheless, [national 
regulatory authorities] are required to take the utmost account of it.’102 Seven agencies set out 
that, while the guidance is not binding, departures from the guidance need to be justified.103 
One of the EASA FAQs articulates the reason for complying with guidance as follows:  
 
If you follow the EASA AMC there is a presumption that you comply with the 
rules, and competent authorities will recognise that compliance without the need 
for any further demonstration of compliance from your side. If you choose to use 
alternative means to comply with the rule, you will need to demonstrate 
compliance with the rule to your competent authority. The burden of proof of 
compliance rests fully with you.104 
 
Similarly, the EMA states that, ‘The Agency strongly encourages applicants and marketing-
authorisation holders to follow these guidelines. Applicants need to justify deviations from 
guidelines fully in their applications at the time of submission.’105 Thus we have guidance, 
which is not binding, but deviations from which need to be disclosed and justified. In 
Momentive Specialty Chemicals, ECHA had rejected the appellants’ registration dossier as 
inadequate because Momentive had failed to comply with ECHA’s guidance. The ECHA 
Board of Appeal commented that, 
 
…in not following the available guidance the Appellant did not avail itself of a 
tool designed to help registrants to prepare and submit their proposals in an 
effective way. The Board of Appeal observes that in so doing the Appellant may 
have required additional effort to justify its case compared with following the 
approach described in the guidance.106 
 
This suggests that while ECHA’s guidance is not necessarily binding on third parties, in that 
registrants are not obliged to follow it, where third parties use standards or take approaches 
different to those set out in the agency’s guidance, ‘additional effort’’ will be required of 
them to justify taking that path. This also suggests that ECHA’s guidance may, in practice, 
only really be semi-soft (and so acts as another challenge to the commonly understand hard 
law/soft law divide, discussed earlier). I would argue that, in practice, the same can be said of 
much of the other guidance produced by other EU agencies. As discussed above, the three 
new financial services agencies (EBA, EIOPA and ESMA) each have a ‘comply or explain’ 
approach to guidance, which is discussed in the 2013 EIOPA Annual Report as follows: 
‘Comply-or-explain for Guidelines issued during 2013 - All national competent authorities 
(NCAs) reported their compliance or intention to comply with the referred Guidelines within 
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http://berec.europa.eu/eng/document_register/subject_matter/berec/regulatory_best_practices/guidelines/1015-
berec-guidelines-on-the-application-of-article-3-of-the-roaming-regulation-wholesale-roaming-access - my 
emphasis 
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para 61  
two months.’107 So, while it is possible to demonstrate compliance other than by the means 
set out in guidance, the data from the sphere of EU financial services regulation suggests 
otherwise.  
  Two of the agencies under review have specific disclaimers in relation to their 
guidance. The single set of guidelines produced by EMSA details that, ‘Under no 
circumstances shall EMSA or any of the other contributors be liable for any loss, damage, 
liability or expense incurred or suffered that is claimed to have resulted from the 
interpretation and the use of the information presented in these Guidelines.’108 Similarly, all 
of ECHA’s guidance documents contain a ‘Legal Notice’ in the following terms, ‘Users are 
reminded that the text of the REACH Regulation is the only authentic legal reference and that 
the information in this document does not constitute legal advice. The European Chemicals 
Agency does not accept any liability with regard to the contents of this document.’109 
  The landscape drawn in this section is full of contradictions: guidance is not binding, 
but adherence is evidence of compliance, departures may need to be highlighted and justified, 
and there is some empirical data that everyone in the real world does what the guidance says. 
Some, but not all, of the EU agencies that produce guidance include statements about the 
binding nature of that guidance and that, even when agencies do include such statements, 
they do not always do so consistently. While this is interesting in terms of on-the-ground 
variation, and so adds some definition to the map of guidance practice, two matters are 
unclear. The first is why some agencies, in some instances, include statements on bindingess. 
Is this simply a drafting preference of the particular agency executive charged with drawing 
up the guidance? Or is it something more?  The second matter is whether these statements, 
and disclaimers, change the nature of the underlying document. In N.V. Elektriciteits 
(discussed further below), ECHA’s Board of Appeal found that ECHA’s FAQs created 
legitimate expectations for registrants.110 Can, or should, a disclaimer (either on a document 
or via a website legal notice) operate to frustrate those expectations? In a case before the ECJ 
disputing when the time limit for bringing proceedings began (publication on the internet or 
publication via the Official Journal), Advocate General Cruz Villalon commented that, ‘For a 
website to be regarded as properly fulfilling an obligation to publish, in the strict sense, it 
must be technically capable of ensuring that a disclaimer such as the one covering the ECHA 
website is, at least for part of the content of that site, plainly unnecessary.’111 Given this, I 
would suggest that the disclaimers used by the EU agencies are meaningless, and arguably 
void, in situations where the underlying legislation mandates the agency to produce guidance.  
    
 
D. Hierarchy in Guidance? 
 
Is a ‘Guideline’ the same as a document headed ‘Guidance’? Are the norms which make up a 
‘Technical Guide’ any different to the norms in an ‘Opinion’? Should a third party be more 
inclined to follow what is in a ‘Nutshell’ and/or a ‘Quick Guide’ and/or the answer to a 
‘FAQ’? There are perhaps two replies to these questions. The first is that what counts is 
substance, not form, and so it is irrelevant what any given document is titled. In France v 
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Commission, the ECJ noted that, ‘The Court has consistently held that an action for 
annulment is available in the case of all measures adopted by the institutions, whatever their 
nature or form, which are intended to have legal effects.’112 The second, alternative, reply is 
that questions as to form and substance only really become engaged in specific contexts – 
that is, when those documents are adjudicated – and that, for the overwhelming majority of 
guidance documents, the likelihood of adjudication is very small indeed. As such, there are 
really no satisfactory or meaningful answers to these questions and thus those to whom they 
are addressed would need, in the real world, to muddle through them as best as they are 
able.113  
When we look at the diversity of post-legislative practice among these 14 EU 
agencies, we see a wide variety of titles given to documents which all, on their face, perform 
similar guidance functions.114 These are set out in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Agency Guidance Formats/Titles 
 
Agency Guidance Formats/Titles 
ACER ‘Guidance’; ‘Q&As’ 
BEREC ‘Guidance’; ‘Common Approaches’; ‘Guidelines’; ‘Guides’ 
‘Methodologies’; ‘Advices’;  
CVPO ‘Guidance’; Notes’; ‘General Instructions’; ‘Technical Protocols’ 
EASA ‘Guidance Materials’; ‘Acceptable Means of Compliance’; ‘FAQs’ 
ECHA  ‘Guidance’; ‘Nutshells’; ‘Factsheets’; ‘Practical Guides’; ‘Formats’; 
‘FAQs’ 
EFSA ‘Guidance’; ‘Opinions’; ‘Statements’; ‘Reasoned Opinions’; ‘Conclusions’; 
‘Reports’ 
EIOPA ‘Guidance Notes’; ‘Guidelines’; ‘Opinions’; ‘One Minute Guides’; ‘FAQs’  
EMSA ‘Guidelines’; ‘Manuals’;  ‘Inventories’ 
ERA ‘Guidance; ‘Technical Specifications for Interoperability’; ‘Application 
Guide’; ‘Specific Guides’  
EBA ‘Guidelines’ 
EMA ‘Guidelines’ 
ESMA ‘Guidelines’ 
OHIM ‘Guidelines’ 
 
The breadth of this miscellany (26 different titles) is striking. There does not appear to 
be any significant correlation with potential different audiences for the guidance,115 nor with 
the different grants of power to the different agencies. Four examples from the 14 agencies 
that produce guidance are worth drawing out. The 27 EIOPA ‘Guidelines’ have their own 
Q&A section which, in turn, then has its own ‘guidance notes’, and one (and only one) of the 
EIOPA ‘Guidelines’ has a linked ‘One Minute Guide’. This Russian doll of post-legislative 
practice is also seen with ECHA (where a number of the agency’s ‘Guidance’ documents 
have linked ‘Nutshells’ and ‘Factsheets’ that summarise the ‘Guidance’ in a shorter form); 
and with ERA (which publishes Technical Specifications for Interoperability (TSIs) 
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guidance in the TSIs.116 ECHA labels everything save for the core guidance documents as 
‘quasi guidance’, with the intent that these are ‘in simple terms’ and particularly intended for 
SMEs.117 While the meaning of ‘quasi guidance’ is tautologous (you only sort of have to 
comply with something you don’t have to comply with), there is an implicit hierarchy of 
norms in the guidance ECHA produces. This is also seen in case law, in a decision by 
ECHA’s Board of Appeal concerning FAQs published by the agency. In N.V. Elektriciteits, 
the Board found that ECHA’s FAQs created legitimate expectations for registrants because of 
the need for registrants to know their legal obligations and because of the precision of the 
relevant FAQS.118 The Board went on to comment on the differences between the 21 
guidance documents produced by ECHA and the Agency’s FAQs: 
 
The legal nature of the FAQs needs to be distinguished from the REACH 
Guidance, which are drafted and issued in close co-operation with the 
stakeholders. Compared to the REACH Guidance, the legal nature of the FAQs is 
different and less complex as the Agency alone decides on the contents of the 
FAQs and their purpose is to directly inform registrants of the Agency’s 
administrative practice.119  
 
Exactly how the ‘legal nature’ of FAQs is ‘different’ to other forms of ECHA guidance is not 
elaborated on by the Board. One possible explanation is that the Board was of the view that 
ECHA ‘Guidance’ was binding on addressees whereas the FAQs only bound the agency itself 
(in situations where the FAQs were sufficiently precise). The EMA website details that its 
Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use issues ‘scientific guidelines’ and then sets 
out, under a heading of ‘Related Document Types’ that, 
 
Historical documents such as 'notes for guidance' are included in the compilation 
where they have the regulatory status of a guideline. Following the 
implementation of the procedure on EU guidelines, however, the use of these 
terms has been discontinued. Documents that do not have the status of a guideline, 
such as position papers, reflection papers or question-and-answer documents, 
continue to be published in the relevant working-party folders.120 
 
But what, exactly, is the ‘regulatory status of a guideline’? Differentiation within guidance 
requires us to take a hard look at what counts (and does not count) for a variety of purposes in 
shaping the operationalization of legislation. The ECHA Board of Appeal accepted that 
FAQs created legitimate expectations for applicants, which is important given just how many 
ECHA FAQs there are.121 Would the same be said of all of the other types of guidance 
document that ECHA or other agencies produce? Is there a point at which guidance stops 
creating legitimate expectations, or is everything that an agency puts out which impacts on 
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the operation of underlying legislation capable of creating expectations that are legitimate? 
There is no clear answer to this in the existing case law. Certainly, the leading EU cases on 
legitimate expectations concern what might be thought of as first order or standard forms of 
guidance: guidelines, decisions etc, all of which are capable of giving rise to legitimate 
expectations.122 Kenneth Armstrong frames new governance as seeking to provide a legal 
response to the proliferation of modes of governance and to explain how these changes 
signal, ‘the decline of a traditional world of hierarchical governance.’123 I wonder whether, in 
the proliferation of multiple forms and formats of guidance, we are now seeing a less 
traditional, but potentially equally hierarchical, form of governance in the post-legislative 
phase.  
 
E. Access and Participation 
 
Conducting much of the research for this paper was painful, and protracted, because of the 
poor quality of the websites of many of the EU’s decentralized agencies.124 This is a function 
both of navigation – how easy it is to move around the site; how it is laid out etc – and where 
and how guidance documents are located on those sites. Some agencies have ‘Document 
Libraries’ on their websites, others have ‘Publications’ sections or take a thematic approach 
and group documents under different sub-pages. The practical difficulties in finding 
documents on those websites that are, or might be, guidance are not insignificant. By 
contrast, all the agencies had a ‘Legislation’ section that was relatively easy to locate.  
Not all of the guidance produced by the EU agencies is available in all of the EU’s 
official languages. Practice varies significantly. Some guidance documents are available only 
in English;125 some in a handful of EU languages;126 and others (a minority) in all of the EU’s 
official languages.127 Claire Kilpatrick argues that, ‘the Rule of Law requires that major 
normative sources should be available in the languages of those subject to them.’128 Are then 
guidance documents ‘major normative sources’? As we saw in Part II of this paper, some of 
the guidance documents are significant both in length and in number, and my other work on 
ECHA has shown that its guidance documents effectively operationalize the Regulation in a 
number of different areas.129 However, almost all of the guidance documents produced by EU 
agencies are available only in a minority of the official languages of the EU.130 There are 
practical translation issues to be overcome, and linked challenges of funding and agency 
staffing, but it is conceivable that the EU courts would consider guidance published only in, 
say, English, an unfair competitive advantage to entities based in the UK and Ireland (and/or 
with English speaking employees).131  
 As with legislation, one’s interest in guidance might extend beyond its current form to 
an interest in previous iterations, and how that guidance has changed over time. Very few, 
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however, of the EU’s agencies allow this sort of enquiry to be undertaken easily.132 ACER is 
unusual in that you can see, within its guidance, a redline document showing tracked changes 
to the guidance over time.133 OHIM does the same for its guidelines.134 On the ERA website, 
previous versions of some of its guidance documents are to be found alongside the current 
versions, together with an overview of the chronology of all the ‘Technical Specifications’ 
(including those that have been repealed).135 However, these are isolated examples.  
What is also concerning is the lack of specificity (and clarity) on how the guidance 
documents are produced, and who has input into them. We might imagine participation along 
a spectrum in which mere consultation is at one end, full public participation is at the other, 
and range of forms of ‘collaborative governance’ in the middle.136 For most of the agencies 
under review, it is not clear where on this spectrum their processes for guidance production 
(if, indeed, such processes are formalized) lie. ACER has a public ‘Guidance Note on 
Consultations’ but this note, oddly, does not refer to ACER guidance.137 Instead the ACER 
guidance Q&As set out, in a rather laconic fashion, that, ‘The non-binding Guidance is 
updated from time to time to reflect changing market conditions and the experience gained by 
the Agency and NRAs in the implementation of REMIT, including through the feedback of 
market participants and other stakeholders.’138 The ‘Consultation’ page of the BEREC 
website sets out that the agency ‘may’ hold a public hearing, consultation periods last 20 days 
and the agency Board has the power to decide when, or if, a public consultation is needed.139 
CPVO is completely silent on how, or if, consultation takes place on its guidance documents. 
EASA is mandated by its founding legislation to consult the Member States and ‘interested 
parties’ when drawing up guidance,140 but the Regulation is silent on exactly how this should 
happen.  
In some of the ‘Explanatory Notes’ that sit alongside EASA’s guidance documents we 
see short comments on how those documents came to be: ‘The content of this Decision is the 
result of an extensive consultation process involving authorities, associations, operators and 
aviation experts’,141 but we are told no more about the relevant authorities, associations, 
operators and experts. With OHIM, it is evident that consultation happens, but it is totally 
opaque as to who actually gets involved, how they know to get involved, how their views are 
taken into account, how disagreements are managed etc.142 A Guidance Consultation 
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Procedure was first adopted by ECHA’s Management Board in 2008.143 However, much of 
the ECHA consultation is closed in that it involves experts ‘whose nominations have been 
received by a specified deadline’144 and who are then formed into partner expert groups 
(PEGs).145 The ECHA website does not detail lists of experts within PEGs formed as part of 
previous consultations on guidance. As noted above, the EBA, EIOPA and ESMA are each 
required, under their foundational legislation, to consult. EIOPA's ‘Statement of Consultation 
Practices’ seems to be all things to all people – we will consult various stakeholders and have 
a 3 month consultation period – but does not say when formal consultation will take place, or 
what for.146  
In their work on the role of private actors in EU regulation, Carolyn Abbott and Maria 
Lee make three suggestions for reform: ‘(i) consistent benchmarks should be developed for 
the reception of outsider contributions within decision-making processes; (ii) the identity or 
(at least) affiliation of those participating in a decision-making process should be publicly 
available; and (iii) regulatory, or public regarding, scrutiny of the contributions of economic 
actors should be strengthened.’147 I would suggest that the above review provides additional 
support for these reforms. Legitimacy is commonly understood in EU law in terms of ‘inputs’ 
and ‘outputs’ (that is, the processes that lead up to the act, and the quality of the end 
product).148 What we see with the production of guidance by EU agencies is that while there 
may be robust processes in place, these are, in the majority of instances, not public. Similarly, 
where those processes are made public, they lack detail and substance.  
 
III. EU JURISPRUDENCE ON GUIDANCE 
 
Joanne Scott and David Trubek have suggested that the EU courts have responded to shifts 
towards newer forms of governance in a variety of ways: thwarting experiments in new 
governance; ignoring those experiments; distorting new governance; or seriously engaging 
with it.149 In later work, Tamara Hervey argues that the relationship between the EU courts 
and new governance operates along a spectrum ranging from, ‘mutual ignorance; through 
separation, either with hierarchy or in parallel; to hybrid forms of mutual transformation.’150 
It is at this furthest end of the spectrum that courts are, ‘open to being persuaded as to the 
normative worth of diverse processes born of the diverse experiences of governance.’151 Such 
openness, as we will see below, has been limited to date in the context of post-legislative 
guidance. 
Judicial review by the EU courts of post-legislative guidance may occur in one of two 
ways: either via a direct action under Article 263 TFEU, or via preliminary references made 
to the EU courts by Member State courts under Article 267 TFEU. However, preliminary 
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references happen infrequently for a variety of reasons.152 Acts adopted by EU agencies are 
acts of an institution of the EU.153 As such, guidance produced by the EU’s 33 decentralised 
agencies should, in theory, be justiciable. The more challenging hurdle is whether those 
guidance documents can be considered ‘acts…intended to produce legal effects’ for the 
purposes of Article 263. In her review of case law in this area, Joanne Scott sets out that 
Commission Communications, Commission Internal Instructions and a Commission Code of 
Conduct have all formed the subject matter of admissible actions for judicial review.154 She 
argues that argues there are three situations in which post-legislative guidance may have legal 
effects (and thus be amenable to review by the EU courts).155 The first is where guidance is 
construed as introducing new obligations and adding to the relevant EU legislation; the 
second situation is where guidance sets out how an EU institution will exercise its 
discretionary and supervisory powers; and the third is where certain measures, through 
express statement in legislation or via implication, may be binding on Member States. 
While, as noted above, many guidance documents are at pains to clearly state that 
they are not legally binding, Scott argues that ‘non-binding should not be equated with an 
absence of (legal) effects and careful, contextual analysis is required to assess and evaluate 
their nature and extent.’156 The practical challenge, however, for the majority of EU agency 
guidance being amenable to judicial review is in whether the EU courts would consider that 
the advice given was simply ‘fleshing out’ or making more explicit existing legislative 
obligations (which has previously been said not to be reviewable),157 or whether that 
guidance added to the underlying legislation (which would open the guidance up to review). 
As set out above in Part II, the real world ‘fleshing out’ of EU legislation via guidance issued 
by EU agencies is thousands of pages long. If the EU courts exclude such documents from 
their purview, they (wrongly) push aside a significant portion of the norms that operationalize 
a wide number of EU legislative texts. 
  Existing EU jurisprudence shows some acceptance that post-legislative guidance 
norms can bind the issuer,158 that these norms can both help in the interpretation of, and can 
act as a supplement to, legally binding EU rules (to the extent that national courts can reliably 
follow them);159 and that such guidance can assist with the uniform and effective application 
of EU law.160 However, the cases on post-legislative norms (compared to other, non-yoked 
forms of soft law) are few in number,161 and most of the substantial commentaries are seen in 
the opinions of the Advocates General (and not in the rulings of the EU courts). It is hoped 
that the map of post-legislative practice offered up in this paper will serve as justification for 
a much closer look by the EU courts at these norms. Such, however, depends greatly on those 
norms being put forward (via direct actions or preliminary references) for adjudication. There 
is little evidence to suggest this is happening. As such, the EU courts acting as ‘catalysts’, 
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creating and prompting ‘occasions for normatively motived and accountable inquiry and 
remediation by actors involved in new governance processes’ seems unlikely.162 
 
 
IV. A WAY FORWARD? 
 
This paper has offered up a map of post-legislative guidance practice among the EU’s 
decentralized agencies. Its findings are summarised in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2: Post-Legislative Guidance Among EU Agencies 
 
Guidance 
Production 
Widespread and significant, but not pervasive. 14 of the 33 EU’s 
decentralised agencies produce self-authored guidance. 
Volume & 
Length 
Varied. From one or two guidance documents (per agency) to 
hundreds of guidance documents; and from a handful of pages (per 
guidance document) to hundreds of thousands of words. 
Access Poorly designed and hard to navigate websites: lack of consistency 
in where guidance documents are housed (under ‘Publications’, 
‘Document Libraries’, ‘Documents’ etc). 
Formats A miscellany of titles: 26 different names for documents which 
each appear to be post-legislative self-authored agency guidance. 
Hierarchy An emerging, but unclear, hierarchy of sorts in post-legislative 
norms: Guidance/Guidelines > Guidance Notes > One Minute 
Guides/Nutshells > FAQs/Q&As. 
Bindingness Contradictory messages: guidance is not legally binding, but 
adherence is evidence of compliance, departures may need to be 
highlighted and justified, and there is some empirical data that 
everyone in the real world does what the guidance says. 
Participation & 
Consultation 
An inconsistent and lackadaisical approach. 
 
This map suggests a level of differentiation that is so ill thought out, and so ad hoc, so lacking 
in foresight and oversight, as to be disfunctional. At the same time, the lack of engagement 
by the EU courts with these norms suggest that the site of opportunity for a way forward in 
this area lies other than with the judiciary. What then should be done? In their work on the 
role of economic actors in EU law, Abbott and Lee call for consistency in approach and 
suggest that this ‘may seem to speak for the desirability of something along the lines of a 
“general administrative law” for the EU.’163 I would suggest that something similar could 
usefully be deployed in the context of post-legislative guidance, either by the Commission or 
by the EU agencies acting in concert to draw up a code of good administrative practice on 
guidance that draws on existing approaches by exemplar agencies.164 This fits in with wider 
calls for a review of the future of EU agencies. In her work in this area, Ellen Vos has argued 
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that, ‘the constitutional disregard of agencies in Article 291 TFEU underlines the 
uncomfortable position of agencies operating in the shadow of hierarchy.’165 
The post-legislative phase is an important and underexplored site of EU norm making, 
which raises challenging rule of law questions of clarity, constancy, legitimacy, participation 
and promulgation.166 A study such as that offered up in this paper shows that, ‘the adoption 
of EU legislation is the beginning rather than the end of a process.’167 My exploration of 
post-legislative practices highlights the messy, challenging, differentiated worlds of how 
power and authority are used, constructed and operationalized in the EU. In the proliferation 
of multiple forms and formats of guidance, we arguably see a less traditional, but potentially 
equally hierarchical, form of governance in the post-legislative phase.  Indeed, I would go so 
far as to argue, and would use this paper as evidence, that we may need to seriously 
reconsider, and reframe, the boundaries of law to account for the breadth and depth of post-
legislative guidance practice. 
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APPENDIX 1 – THE EU’S DECENTRALIZED AGENCIES 
 
1. Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) 
2. Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) 
3. Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) 
4. European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA) 
5. European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders (FRONTEX) 
6. European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area 
of freedom, security and justice (eu-LISA) 
7. European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 
8. European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) 
9. European Banking Authority (EBA) 
10. European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) 
11. European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop) 
12. European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) 
13. European Environment Agency (EEA) 
14. European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) 
15. European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) 
16. European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 
(EUROFOUND) 
17. European GNSS Agency (GSA) 
18. European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) 
19. European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) 
20. European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) 
21. European Medicines Agency (EMA) 
22. European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) 
23. European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) 
24. European Police College (CEPOL) 
25. European Police Office (EUROPOL) 
26. European Railway Agency (ERA) 
27. European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) 
28. European Training Foundation (ETF) 
29. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) 
30. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (OHIM) 
31. Single Resolution Board (SRB) 
32. The European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit (EUROJUST) 
33. Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union (CdT) 
